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ABSTRACT
The Freedom of Information Act 2000 ('FOIA') came into force on 1 January
2005. It created, for the first time, a statutory right of access to information held
by a wide range of public authorities. The right of access extends to all
information held, regardless of how old the information is and the format in
which it is held, unless one of the absolute exemptions listed in the Act is
applicable, or the public interest test for disclosure is not satisfied in respect of
a qualified exemption. Significantly, the Act also contains a power of
ministerial veto, the effect of which is that orders to disclose information under
the Act are rendered ineffective if a minister certifies that they have "reasonable
grounds" for having formed the opinion that non­disclosure would not be
unlawful. Prior to R (on the application of Evans) and another v Attorney General,
[2] there was a lack of certainty regarding what constituted 'reasonable
grounds' for the issuance of a ministerial certificate. As well as clarifying the
threshold for reasonable grounds for issuing a veto, this judgment also engages
in a discussion of the relationship between three fundamental constitutional
principles: the rule of law, separation of powers and parliamentary sovereignty
to determine the extent to which it is legally and constitutionally legitimate for
a court exercising powers of judicial review to strike down a Government
Minister's decision made under powers granted by Parliament to overturn an
independent judicial tribunal's judgment. Thus, the decision is of interest to
those seeking to assess its potential contribution to discourse on common law
constitutionalism.
1. INTRODUCTION: THE FACTS
In April 2005, Mr Evans, a journalist employed by Guardian News and Media
Ltd (The Guardian), sought disclosure of written communications [3] between
the Prince of Wales and ministers in seven government departments. The
request, made under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) 2000, [4] was
intended to discover how frequently the Prince of Wales communicated with
government ministers and whether he sent 'advocacy correspondence,' that is,
attempted to exert influence over government policies. The request was
prompted by admissions by the Prince that he interacted with Government
ministers in this way in an approved biography published a decade ago. [5] At
the time of the request the information sought was the subject of a 'qualified
exemption,' that is, the information could only be withheld if the application of
a public interest test indicated that the public interest favoured non­disclosure.
[6]
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Initially, the departments refused to confirm or deny whether the information
was held. In response, Mr Evans complained to the Information Commissioner
(ICO) who confirmed that the departments were entitled to refuse to disclose
the information because, on balance, the public interest favoured non­
disclosure. [7]
This prompted Mr Evans to appeal to the First­Tier Tribunal. [8] Due to the
constitutional complexity and significance of the case, the First­Tier Tribunal
immediately transferred to the matter to the Upper Tribunal for determination.
On 18th September 2012 the Upper Tribunal allowed the appeal against the
Commissioner's decision and ordered disclosure of 'advocacy correspondence,'
on the ground that it would be in the public interest for there to be
transparency as to how and when Prince Charles sought to influence
government, but made it made clear that the ruling did not extend to disclosure
of correspondence which was of a personal nature or which otherwise fell
within the category of communications which by convention was regarded as
part of his 'preparation for kingship.' [9]
Significantly, the government departments concerned did not appeal this
decision to the Court of Appeal. Instead, on 16th October 2012, the Attorney
General, [10] exercised the power of ministerial veto, that is, issued a section 53
signed certificate that he believed he had on reasonable grounds formed the
opinion that the Departments had been entitled to refuse to disclose the letters.
The Attorney­General's justification for issuing the veto was premised on a
belief that disclosure of the letters would have undermined public confidence
in Charles's capacity to serve as monarch, given that strongly held views in the
letters might cause people to question his political neutrality. [11]
This prompted Evans to seek a judicial review of the Attorney General's
decision. [12] He was unsuccessful; the Administrative Court held that the use
of the executive power had been lawful on the basis that releasing the letters
could damage Prince Charles's role as future King, but expressed 'troublesome
concerns' [13] about the power of a minister to override a judge­made decision,
which was described by Judge LCJ as a 'constitutional aberration' [14] because
it allowed the executive to reverse a judicial decision in a manner clearly at
odds with the doctrine of the separation of powers.
Thereafter, Mr Evans appealed to the Court of Appeal contending the Attorney
General did not have reasonable grounds for issuing the certificate under
section 53(2) of the FOIA 2000. The Court of Appeal ruled [15] that it was not
reasonable for the Attorney General to issue a certificate merely because he
disagreed with the decision of the Upper Tribunal. Something more was
required. Examples of what would suffice were a material change of
circumstances since the decision or that the decision was demonstrably flawed
in fact or in law. [16] Accordingly, it quashed the certificate. The Attorney
General responded by appealing to the Supreme Court.
2. THE SUPREME COURT JUDGMENT
Thus, a decade after the journalist made his request for information the case
finally reached the Supreme Court where it was heard by seven justices who
had to determine whether the certificate issued by the Attorney General under
section 53(2) FOIA 2000 vetoing the Upper Tribunal's order that the
correspondence should be disclosed was valid. This involved consideration of
the correct interpretation and application of s 53 (2) of the FOIA 2000, which
states:
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'A decision notice or enforcement notice to which this section
applies shall cease to have effect if, not later than the twentieth
working day following the effective date, the accountable person
in relation to that authority gives the Commissioner a certificate
signed by him stating that he has on reasonable grounds formed the
opinion that, in respect of the request or requests concerned, there
was no failure falling within subsection.' (Emphasis added)
The Supreme Court held by a 5:2 majority that the ministerial certificate issued
by the Attorney General was invalid, ruling that a minister could not veto a
decision of the Upper Tribunal merely because having considered the same
facts and arguments, the minister came to a different view. However, there was
a split among the five justices regarding the reasons for the certificate being
invalid, with three using high level constitutional principles whilst two relied
upon administrative principles.
2.1 CONSTITUTIONAL APPROACH
Lord Neuberger (with whom Lords Kerr and Reed agreed) framed the issue
regarding the validity of the Attorney General's Certificate in constitutional law
terms and drew upon constitutional law principles to construe the veto power
narrowly. He observed that a statutory provision that entitled a member of the
executive to overrule a judicial decision merely because they do not agree with
it 'would be unique…[because it would]…cut across two constitutional
principles which are also fundamental components of the rule of law.' [17] The
first principle, is that, subject to being overruled by a higher court or a statute
court decisions are 'binding as between the parties, and cannot be ignored or
set aside by anyone including (indeed it may fairly be said, least of all) the
executive.' [18] The second principle is that decisions and actions of the
executive are 'reviewable by the court at the suit of an interested citizen,' [19]
but not vice versa. He invoked the House of Lords' seminal judgment in
Anisminic v Foreign Compensation Commission [20] to shape the view that if a
minister could use the veto power merely because they disagreed with a
Tribunal decision, this would 'stand on its head' the principle that the Executive
are subject to the rule of law, and concomitantly, executive actions are
amenable to judicial review.
However, another fundamental constitutional principle is parliamentary
sovereignty, and such a power appears to be what parliament provided for in
section 53. Lord Neuberger countered this by invoking the constitutional
principle of legality, ruling that if Parliament intends to permit the executive to
challenge fundamental constitutional principles by granting ministers power to
override a judicial decision merely because they disagree with that decision, it
must 'squarely confront what it is doing' [21] and make its intentions 'crystal
clear.' [22]
In the absence of such a parliamentary intention he advocated a restrictive
interpretation, of the phrase 'reasonable grounds.' He referred with approval to,
Jackson v Attorney General, [23] ex parte Simms, [24] Axa General Insurance Ltd v
HM Advocate [25] and cited Lord Steyn in R v Secretary of State for the Home
Department, ex parte Pierson '[u]nless there is the clearest provision to the
contrary, Parliament must be presumed not to legislate contrary to the rule of
law' [26] to illustrate that the common law principle of legality, which holds
that only clear and specific words can be used to legislate contrary to
fundamental constitutional rights, should be used to guide the statutory
interpretation.
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This led him to endorse the view advanced by Lord Dyson MR in the Court of
Appeal [27] that 'reasonable grounds' to issue the certificate would necessitate a
'material change of circumstances' [28] since the Tribunal decision was taken, or
matters come to light that the decision is 'demonstrably flawed in fact or in
law… but cannot give rise to an appeal against that decision.' [29] Whilst this
approach preserves the veto power, the high threshold for invoking it limits its
usage to exceptional circumstances. [30]
Since no evidence or arguments were presented that there had been a material
change of circumstances or that the Tribunal decision had ben demonstrably
flawed, he found that the Attorney General did not have reasonable grounds to
issue the certificate to overturn the decision of the Upper Tribunal. His actions
were deemed unlawful and the certificate invalid, thus permitting the
fulfilment of the Upper Tribunal's disclosure order.
2.2 AN ADMINISTRATIVE APPROACH
Lord Mance (with whom Lady Hale agreed) also found the Attorney General's
exercise of the veto unlawful. He framed the issue regarding the validity of the
Attorney General's Certificate as an administrative law matter, viewing the
interpretation of section 53(2) as a question of mere statutory interpretation and
contextual application of administrative law principles derived from prior
judgments concerning the extent to which governmental departments are
bound by decisions of administrative tribunals.
Whilst he was prepared to accept that, in principle, section 53 of the Act
permits ministers to veto a decision merely because they disagree with it on the
balance of 'competing interests,' he stated that such disagreement as to matters
of fact or law would require the clearest possible justification, that is, 'properly
explained and solid reasons.' [31] In his view, the case turned upon a close
assessment of the reasonableness of the Attorney General's decision. Usually,
reasonableness would be determined by reference to the Wednesbury principle,
which requires the decision to be rationally defensible in the sense of not being
manifestly unreasonable. However, Lord Mance said that section 53(2) erects a
'higher hurdle' than 'mere rationality' [32] that might only be satisfied in the
limited circumstances contemplated by Lord Neuberger. Lord Mance said that
close scrutiny of the reasonableness of the decision was appropriate because the
Upper Tribunal heard evidence, called and cross­examined in public, as well as
submissions on both sides, whereas the Attorney General had not, consulting in
private, and forming his own view without inter partes representations. [33] In
insisting on 'close scrutiny' he made it clear that the separation of powers
doctrine does not preclude judicial review of executive decisions, indeed that
review should be intensive and involve close scrutiny in circumstances in
which the Executive seeks to override the reasoned decision of an independent
judicial body.
However, he then drew a distinction between questions of fact and law, and
questions pertaining to the balancing of public interests. He confirmed that a
lower level of scrutiny would suffice in relation to the balancing of public
interests 'the weighing of such interests is a matter which the statute
contemplates and which a certificate could properly address, by properly
explained and solid reasons.' This distinction accords with the doctrine of
separation of powers, which traditionally afforded the executive greater
latitude in respect of decisions involving public policy matters.
Applying this approach, he concluded that the Attorney General had
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impermissibly undertaken his own redetermination since 'it was [not] open to
the Attorney General to issue a certificate under section 53 on the basis of
opposite or radically differing conclusions about the factual position and the
constitutional conventions without, at the lowest, explaining why the tribunal
was wrong to make the findings and proceed on the basis it did.' [34]
2.3 DISSENT
In a dissenting opinion, Lord Hughes adopted a constitutional approach. He
addressed Lord Neuberger's assertion regarding the 'constitutional importance
of the principle that a decision of the executive should be reviewable by the
judiciary' [35] with a constitutionally framed rebuttal that the 'rule of law is of
the first importance. But it is an integral part of the rule of law that courts give
effect to Parliamentary intention. The rule of law is not the same as a rule that
courts must always prevail, no matter what the statute says.' [36] He concluded
that ministerial certificate was lawfully issued on the basis that section 53
empowered the Attorney General to issue the certificate if he disagreed with
the decision of the Upper Tribunal on 'reasonable grounds' and this must
include the ability to disagree on the degree of weight to be given the different
interests when assessing whether disclosure of the advocacy correspondence
was in the public interest. To construe the section otherwise would strain the
words of Parliament too far in his opinion.
Lord Wilson agreed with Lord Hughes that the issuing of the certificate was
valid but approached it from an administrative, statutory interpretation
perspective. In his view, interpretation of section 53 in the manner proposed by
Lord Neuberger would amount to re­writing the section. Moreover, whilst he
acknowledged that the principle of the separation of powers would be
breached were the executive to be able to override a tribunal decision on a
matter of law, he contended this was not a relevant consideration when it came
to the weighing up of competing interests to determine the public interest.
3. IMPLICATIONS
The judgement is of interest to both information rights lawyers ­ for the clarity
it provides regarding use of the ministerial veto, in the short­term, at least,
since it has triggered a review of the law. It is also of interest to constitutional
scholars seeking to explore whether it contributes to the advancement of
common law constitutionalism. Both aspects are discussed below.
3.1 FOIA 2000 IMPLICATIONS
In one respect, this decision is of historical interest only, in that such a request
for access to correspondence by the Prince of Wales would no longer be
successful since section 37 of FOIA was amended in 2010 [37] so as to render
communications with the monarch and two nearest heirs to the throne
absolutely exempt from disclosure.
However, the decision is nevertheless seminal since it clarifies when a
ministerial veto can be issued. During the passage of the Bill, the issuance of a
veto in respect of a court or tribunal decisions was not debated. This judgment
makes it clear that the Executive cannot issue ministerial certificates vetoing the
release of information when a First Tier or Upper Tribunal decision displeases
them for politically sensitive reasons. [38] In future, ministers will have to
satisfy a higher threshold of a 'material change of circumstances' or that the
decision was 'demonstrably flawed in fact or law.'
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Going forward, the body which made the decision may be more relevant, since
Lord Neuberger stated in obiter comments that the threshold for a lawful veto
is lower in respect of ICO decisions because the ICO's evaluation can seldom be
as exhaustive as that of a Tribunal. [39] However, he also commented that 'the
executive should normally be expected to appeal an adverse determination of
the Commissioner rather than issuing a section 53 certificate,' [40] reinforcing
the view that a ministerial certificate should only be issued in exceptional
circumstances, since issuing a veto rather than pursuing an appeal could
constitute an abuse of power. Thus, Ministers should modify their approach in
future, appealing ICO decisions rather than simply issuing a veto, as they did
following an ICO decision regarding the High Speed 2 (HS2) rail project, and
one of the two vetoes issued in respect of Iraq war cabinet meetings. [41]
The decision has been praised by both the Information Commissioner, who
commended it for 'offering greater clarity' [42] and the Chairman of the
Campaign for Information (CFOI), an intervener in the case, on the basis that:
'This is a critical decision which strengthens the FOI Act. It says the
courts not ministers normally have the last word. If the
government disagrees with a ruling on good grounds it should
appeal. The veto is not a trump card to be slipped out of a
minister's sleeve to block any embarrassing disclosure. Minister
will now have to argue their case not impose it.' [43]
However, this decision may not be the final word on the legality of vetoes as a
spokesman for the Prime Minister made a post­judgement announcement
expressing disappointment, that 'Our FOI laws specifically include the option
of a governmental veto, which we exercised in this case for a reason. If the
legislation does not make Parliament's intentions for the veto clear enough,
then we will need to make it clearer.' [44] Indeed, a Commission was recently
appointed to review the effectiveness of the Act, with a remit to: 'consider
whether there is an appropriate public interest balance between transparency,
accountability and the need for sensitive information to have robust protection,'
[45] which undoubtedly will include a review of the effectiveness of the veto
power.
3.2 CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS
The judgments illustrate the complex and dynamic interactions between the
three fundamental principles ­ the rule of law, the sovereignty of Parliament
and the separation of powers. Given that it involved an examination of the
interplay between the rule of law and parliamentary sovereignty in the context
of a clash between the Upper Tribunal exercising judicial power and the
Attorney General exercising executive power it is of particular interest to
scholars seeking to advance debate on 'common law constitutionalism.' [46]
Lord Justice Laws, Trevor Allen and others have advanced this heterodox
constitutional theory which contends that the doctrine of parliamentary
sovereignty is a common law norm the judiciary could unilaterally modify or
repudiate in certain circumstances; in particular, it may be capable of being
overridden by more fundamental common law norms such as the principle of
the rule of law. [47] This decision does contribute to the discourse on common
law constitutionalism in an incremental way, by elucidating the principle of the
rule of law and adding substantive knowledge regarding one aspect of it, the
principle of legality.
Lord Neuberger (majority) and Lord Hughes (dissent) agreed that the rule of
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law favours both Executive compliance with judicial decisions and the
availability of judicial review of administrative action. However, they
disagreed about the way in which the rule of law and parliamentary
sovereignty are to be understood as relating to one another. For instance, Lord
Hughes considered the relationship between the two principles:
'The rule of law is of the first importance. But it is an integral part
of the rule of law that courts give effect to Parliamentary intention.
The rule of law is not the same as a rule that courts must always
prevail, no matter what the statute says.' [48]
Similarly, Lord Neuberger did not claim that the rule of law should override
parliamentary sovereignty nor did he endorse passages inJackson [49] and Axa
[50] that cast doubt on the principle of parliamentary sovereignty. Rather he
reconciled the two principles by drawing upon an aspect of the rule of law,
namely the principle of legality. In requiring clear and specific words of
parliamentary intent to legislate contrary to fundamental constitutional rights
and values he mediated between the two principles. Parliamentary legislative
sovereignty was not challenged; rather he called for greater clarity from
Parliament when legislating. However, the two Justices disagreed on whether
Parliament had in fact expressed its legislative intent clearly, with Lord Hughes
finding that it had:
'I agree that Parliament will not be taken to have empowered a
member of the executive to override a decision of a court unless it
has made such an intention explicit. I agree that courts are entitled
to act on the basis that only the clearest language will do this. In
my view, however, Parliament has plainly shown such an
intention in the present instance.' [51]
It remains to be seen whether the judges would revise their approach if,
following the newly appointed Commission's review of the Act, Parliament
were to legislate using words that make it exceptionally clear that a ministerial
certificate could be issued to veto a Tribunal decision and that such exercise of
the veto power would not be amenable to judicial review. I share Elliott's view
that 'such a provision might plausibly be considered to fall into that category ­
if it exists at all ­ of legislation so constitutionally egregious as to test the courts'
commitment to the absolute supremacy of Parliament.' [52]
4. CONCLUSIONS
After a decade­long legal battle, the journalist finally succeeded in gaining
access to the correspondence requested. The disclosed correspondence
confirms that the Prince of Wales does engage in 'advocacy' ­ routinely seeking
to impress his views upon government ministers. [53] Somewhat surprisingly
the revelations do not appear to have damaged his prospects of succeeding to
the throne, despite the long­standing convention that the monarch is expected
to be politically neutral, perhaps explainable by the fact that he is currently an
'heir' rather than a reigning monarch and the fact that the disclosures relate to
historic correspondence which has lost its 'value.'
Whilst the Government expressed disappointment that the veto power was not
as effective as they had anticipated, it is to be hoped that the Commission will
look at the issue with a fresh perspective, recognising that the veto power
should be used sparingly, in exceptional circumstances, as per the guidance of
the Supreme Court, and accordingly, there is no need for reform to make it
easier for ministers to exercise the power, not least because such action would
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reduce the effectiveness of the Act.
Also, whilst Lord Neuberger deployed a strained approach to statutory
interpretation to neutralize the constitutional challenge presented by the power
granted by Parliament in FOIA 2000 to a government minister to overturn a
decision of an independent judicial body, the judgment confirms that the
judiciary are, nevertheless, alert to the constitutional dangers of such measures.
Indeed, the invitation in Lord Neuberger's judgment to Parliament to revise the
Freedom of Information Act 2000 so that it contains clearer words of intention
regarding the power of ministerial veto and non­justiciability of its exercise
could also be interpreted as cautionary advice to Parliament ­ a warning that
that such a course of action could prove both politically unpopular with the
electorate and precipitate a constitutional crisis.
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